Class of 2030
You're shown this year's job market. You enter the market of the year you graduate.
This tool won't tell you whether to study it. It shows you the shape of the bet.
ACS 2023 PUMS, employed bachelor's holders aged 22–32. Left column is share of graduates; right column is that occupation's AI exposure (0 = none, 1 = the full job could be covered).
| Occupation | Share of graduates | AI exposure ● | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
PWGTP-weighted. Exposure comes from Eloundou et al. (2023) human-rated β scores,
joined from Census occupation codes to SOC by token overlap; the match rate for occupations listed on this
page is 97.2%.FOD1P records the bachelor's field
even when a person's career is driven by a later graduate degree. It measures the stock of employed workers,
not recent-graduate flow. Exposure is a predicted measure — not a record of jobs actually replaced.
Three outcomes for recent graduates of this major, each shown against the median of the majors on this page. Blue dot is this major; the grey tick is the peer median.
ESR = 3). Single-year sample, so treat differences under about 1 point as noise.Full-time workers aged 22–32, 25th to 75th percentile of annual wages; the tick is the median. The width of the bar is the point. A high median with a wide spread is a different bet from a lower median with a narrow one.
WAGP, adjusted by ADJINC, restricted to WKHP ≥ 35 and
positive wages, PWGTP-weighted. Wages are self-reported and cluster on round numbers, so medians
for different majors sometimes land on the same value — the percentile spread is the more informative reading.
National figures; cost of living is not adjusted for, and the geographic mix differs by major.
Indeed new-postings index (Feb 2020 = 100). Solid line is observed; dotted line extrapolates the last 24 months; the shaded area is the confidence interval. Drag the graduation-year slider and watch the interval widen.
The projection is a log-linear trend fit to the last 24 months. The confidence band is the standard deviation of historical 12-month changes × √(years ahead) — a random-walk-style expansion. Volatility is estimated excluding the 2020–21 COVID shock, which would otherwise inflate the band with a one-off event. The band widens as you push graduation later. That is deliberate: the further out you look, the less anyone can tell you.
This line measures postings at all seniority levels, not entry-level only. Occupation × seniority postings data is paid-only in the US (Lightcast, $22k–136k/yr) with no free substitute. The known national entry-level signal: Indeed, May 2026 — entry-level postings −7.5% YoY against senior postings +14.7% YoY.
Effective occupations = exp(entropy of the occupational distribution), with Miller–Madow small-sample bias correction applied. Higher means more viable alternative paths if the main exit closes. Click any row to switch.
The strongest refutation of this tool's own narrative, placed here rather than left for someone else to bring up.
It may not be AI. It may be interest rates. The Economic Innovation Group (Jan 2026) analyzed 238 million US job postings across 767 occupations and found that entry-level and senior postings fell in parallel starting in spring 2022 — six months before ChatGPT launched, and aligned with the Fed's first rate hike in March 2022. If that holds, the primary driver of shrinking entry-level hiring may be monetary policy rather than technology.
Stanford Digital Economy Lab addressed this interest-rate confound directly in a February 2026 research note, and their July 2026 finding on gender gaps also concluded that AI was not the main driver.
This tool presents an observable fact — the entrance is narrowing — alongside the competing explanations for it. It does not claim causation.
Every limit below is load-bearing — each one changes how a number on this page should be read. They are listed here rather than hidden in a methodology footnote, with an honest status for each: some are fixable, some are not fixable with any public data that exists today.
ACS records field of degree only for people who hold a bachelor's. Anyone whose path ran through an associate degree, a certificate, an apprenticeship, or no degree at all is invisible in every number here — including in the underemployment denominator. This tool describes what happened to people who finished a four-year degree, and nothing else.
Built on the ACS 2023 1-year file. Entropy — the basis of fallback width — is systematically underestimated at small samples: roughly 23% low at n ≈ 1,000 and 68% low at n ≈ 100. Majors below n = 1,500 are flagged as sample-limited and should not be ranked against large ones. Miller–Madow bias correction is already applied, which reduces but does not remove the problem.
This is the sharpest gap between what the tool shows and what it is about. The door-velocity chart counts every opening in a field, senior roles included — while the entire premise of the project is that entry-level and senior hiring have decoupled. Occupation × seniority postings data is paid-only in the United States (Lightcast, $22k–136k/yr); every published study on this question licensed it. The free national signal is directional only: entry-level postings −7.5% YoY against senior +14.7% (Indeed, May 2026).
The exposure score rates what a language model could plausibly do with an occupation's tasks. It is not a measurement of jobs actually automated, and a high score is not evidence that anyone lost work. Observed-usage datasets exist — Anthropic's Economic Index and Microsoft's Copilot study both measure what people actually delegate to AI — and compositing them in is the right next step, with the disagreement between predicted and observed shown rather than averaged away.
ACS is a cross-section. The 22–32 cohort is the closest available proxy for recent graduates, but it is still a stock of everyone in that age band, not a flow of one year's leavers. This matters most for route divergence, where ordinary career progression and a changed entry market look identical. Only a longitudinal panel could separate them.
Majors do not distribute evenly across the country, so a national wage median silently compares graduates living in different price environments. This is now corrected: each graduate's wage is deflated by the BEA regional price parity of the state they live in, and the toggle above the earnings chart switches between as-reported and cost-adjusted. The geographic concentration behind each major is shown under the chart, so the size of the correction is traceable rather than asserted. Adjustment is at state level; within-state variation between a metro and a rural county is not captured.